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Abstract
Security in mobile ad hoc network is a grand challenge problem nowadays. The
security issues in MANET are mostly concentrated in two parts, establishing secure
route and securely data transmission. The main security threat in MANET are
integrity, non-repudiation and privacy. To combat with these security threats,
many secure routing protocols has been designed to reduce the security threats
in MANET. Most of the secure routing protocol available in the literature are based
on certification authority or key distribution center, which leads to needs of central
authority. In this thesis, we have proposed a secure routing protocol called “A Novel
Approach of Secure Routing Protocol (NASRP)” to enhance the security levels in the
routing protocol to prevent the network against active and passive attacks without
the presence of central authority. A peer review process has been introduced to
check the integrity and non-repudiation of the routing packets and key exchange
packets. In the first step each node will exchange keys with their neighbours, in the
second step routing packet delivery is done by the peer review process and in the
final stage data delivery is done by encryption/decryption mechanism using session
key.
Keywords: Secure Routing Protocol, Dynamic Source Routing, NASRP, Public Key
Exchange, Certification Authority, Key-Distribution Center , Ad Hoc on Demand Distance Vector,
Secret Key, Routing Attacks, Peer Review Process.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
“Ad Hoc” is a Latin phrase, which means “for this”, meaning “for this special
purpose only”, by expansion it is a special network for a particular application.
Mobile ad hoc network is infrastructure less network of mobile nodes (hosts) that
are connected through the wireless links. In mobile ad hoc network, no central
authority (node) is present which can control the network. Due to the resource
constrain mobile ad hoc network faces lot of various challenges as compared to the
wired network such as error prone broadcast channels, limited bandwidth, hidden
and exposed terminal problems, frequent topology changes, power constraints and
security issues [1].
Security issues is one of the greatest challenge in MANET. Mobile ad hoc network
is more vulnerable due to its wireless channel and the lack of central authority. The
security issues in MANET are mostly concentrated in two parts establishing secure
route and securely data transmission. Routing protocol in MANET are not free
from attacks. So to communicate securely we need to secure routing algorithm first
unless only securing data communication can not provide security, safe and secure
communication in mobile ad hoc network.
1
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In this thesis work we consider secure routing algorithm and secure data
transmission both the issues. So that before communication we can establish
secure route for data delivery. In our proposed secure routing protocol, integrity,
non-repudiation and confidentiality issues are taken into consideration which can
prevent many security threat in mobile ad hoc communication.
Chapter Organization: section 1.2 describes the motivation, section 1.3
contains the objectives of the thesis, section 1.4 describes the thesis organization
and section 1.5 contains summary of the chapter.
1.2 Motivation
After the study, we found that the presence of malicious node affects the
communication process in MANET, which breaks integrity and confidentiality of
the message. So the purpose of the communication is being violated. Due to the
lack of central authority and wireless channel it is much more vulnerable. In any
communication, routing protocol plays a great role to find the destination. This is
the reason why attackers has chosen to attack routing protocol. If the attacker can
modify the routing packets, it can modify the route. There are numbers of attacks are
possible in MANET; those are Flooding Attack, Sleep Deprivation, Impersonation
Attack, Black Hole Attack, Node Isolation Attack, Routing Table Poisoning Attack,
Wormhole Attack, Location Disclosure Attack, Rushing Attacks, Blackmail, Snare
Attack, The Invisible Node Attack. So to communicate securely in mobile ad hoc
network we need to have a secure routing protocol.
1.3 Objective
Our objectives are:
• To design a secure routing protocol for mobile ad hoc network without
the presence of central Authority (CA/KDC), which can maintain the
2
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confidentiality, integrity and non-repudiation of the communication.
• To analysis the secure routing protocol against all possible attacks in mobile
ad hoc network.
• Comparing our secure routing algorithm with other existing secure routing
protocol.
1.4 Thesis Organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, we discuss briefly about
the Mobile Ad Hoc Network, various challenges in MANET and various possible
security threats in MANET. In Chapter 3, we discuss about the literature surveys
that have been done during the research work. In Chapter 4, we proposed a secure
routing protocol called A Novel Approach of Secure Routing Algorithm; its design
and architecture. In Chapter 5, we discuss about the analysis of our proposed secure
routing protocol. In Chapter 6, we have given a comparison of our proposed secure
routing protocol with existing secure routing protocols. Finally in chapter 7, we
conclude our thesis.
1.5 Summary
In this chapter we have briefly describe the problem definition, motivation, objective
of our thesis work and in the last section we have mentioned the organization of our
thesis in subsequent chapters.
3
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Background Concepts
2.1 Introduction
Now a days mobility is becoming increasingly important for users of computing
systems. Science and technology has made it possibly more powerful, smaller and less
expensive wireless communicating devices (nodes). As a result users gain flexibility
and the ability to exchange information and maintain connectivity while roaming
through a wide area. The necessary support for mobile computing is being provided
in some areas by installing base stations and access points. Mobile system users
can maintain their connectivity by accessing this infrastructure from office, home or
while on the road.
Mobile computing support is not available in all locations; due to high cost, low
expected usage, or poor performance access points may not be set up . This may
happen during outdoor conferences or in emergency situations like natural disasters
and military services in inaccessible places. If mobile users wants to communicate
without a support structure, they must form an ad hoc network. In this chapter,
we look at mobile ad hoc networking in details. We present their applications,
characteristics, analyse the complexities and design constraints associated with them
and classify the existing routing algorithms in it.
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Chapter Organization: Section 2.2 describes the brief about Mobile Ad Hoc
Network, its applications, characteristics, complexity and design of MANET, section
2.3 describes the security issues in MANET, section 2.4 describes different types of
attacks on ad hoc network routing protocols, section 2.5 describes routing protocol,
sub section 2.5.1 describes AODV, subsection 2.5.2 describes DSR routing protocol
and section 2.6 describes the summary of the chapter.
2.2 Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
A mobile ad hoc network (MANET), sometimes called a wireless ad hoc network
or a wireless mesh network of mobile nodes, comprises of mobile computing devices
(nodes) that uses wireless transmission for communication, without the presence
of any established infrastructure or centralized authority or administration such
as an access point in wireless local area network or a base station in cellular
network [2]. The nodes are free to move randomly and organize arbitrarily; thus,
the topology of the wireless network may change rapidly and unpredictably. Such
type of network may operate in a standalone fashion, or it may be connected to
the larger Internet. Unlike traditional mobile wireless networks, MANETs do not
rely on any central coordinator but communicate in a self organized way. Mobile
nodes can communicate to each other directly via wireless links if nodes are with
in each other radio range, while nodes are far apart, should rely on other nodes
to relay messages as routers. In mobile ad hoc network each node acts both as a
host (capable of sending and receiving) and a router (forwards the data intended
for some other node). Hence such networks sometime call as multi-hop wireless
ad hoc networks. Figure 2.1 shows an example of mobile ad hoc network and its
communication technology.
As shown in Figure 2.1, an ad hoc network might consist of several personal
computing devices, including laptops, PDA, cellular phones, and so on. Each devices
will be able to communicate directly with any other node in the network that resides
5
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within its transmission range. For communicating with devices that reside beyond
this range, the devise needs to use intermediate device to relay the messages hop by
hop.
Figure 2.1: A Typical Mobile Ad Hoc Network
2.2.1 Application of Mobile Ad Hoc Network
Application of mobile ad hoc networks are numerous [3] [4]. Those are as follows
• Tactical networks
– Military communication and operations
– Automated battlefields
• Emergency services
– Search and rescue operations
– Disaster recovery
– Replacement of fixed infrastructure in case of environmental disasters
– Policing and fire fighting
– Supporting doctors and nurses in hospitals
• Commercial and civilian environments
6
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– E-commerce: electronic payments any time and anywhere
– Business: dynamic database access, mobile offices
– Vehicular services: road or accident guidance, transmission of road and
weather conditions, taxi cab network, inter-vehicle networks
– Sports stadiums, trade fairs, shopping malls
– Networks of visitors at airports
• Home and enterprise networking
– Home/office wireless networking
– Conferences, meeting rooms
– Personal area networks (PAN), Personal networks (PN)
– Networks at construction sites
• Education
– Universities and campus settings
– Virtual classrooms
– Ad hoc communications during meetings or lectures
• Sensor networks
– Home applications: smart sensors and actuators embedded in consumer
electronics
– Body area networks (BAN)
– Data tracking of environmental conditions, animal movements,
chemical/biological detection
• Coverage extension
– Extending cellular network access
– Linking up with the Internet, Intranets, etc.
7
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2.2.2 Characteristics, Complexities and Design Constraints
Mobile ad hoc network eliminates the constraint of infrastructure set up and enable
devices to create and join networks on the fly, any where, any time and virtually
for any application. However, these flexibilities and convenience do come at a price.
Mobile ad hoc networks inherit the common problems of wireless networking in
general [5], and add their own constraints specific to ad hoc routing. Some of
the notable characteristics, complexities and design constraints of MANETs are
presented below [6]:
• Dynamic and changing network topology: In mobile ad hoc networks,
because nodes can move arbitrarily, the network topology, which is typically
multi-hop, can change frequently and unpredictably, resulting in route changes,
frequent network partitions, and possibly packet losses.
• Wireless medium: In an ad hoc environment, nodes communicate wirelessly
and share the same media (radio, infrared etc.). The wireless medium has
neither absolute, nor readily observable boundaries outside of which the
stations are unable to receive network frames. Thus the channel is unprotected
from outside signals and hence it is significantly less reliable than wired media.
• Limited availability of resources: Because batteries carried by each mobile
no have limited power supply, processing power is limited, which in turn lim
services and applications that can be supported by each node. This becomes
bigger issue in MANET because, since each node is acting as both an end
syste and a router at the same time, additional energy is required to forward
packets.
• Autonomous and infrastructureless: MANET does not depend on any
established infrastructure or centralized administration. Each node operates
in distributed peer-to-peer mode, acts as an independent router and generates
independent data. Network management has to be distributed across different
8
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nodes, which brings added difficulty in fault detection and management
2.3 Security Issues in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
Mobile ad hoc network is not free from different active and passive attacks [7]. Due
to the lack of central authority and resource constrains it is much more vulnerable.
Depending upon the malicious node location attacks are classified into two different
type, namely internal attacks and external attacks. And depending upon the
operation it is also classified into two types, namely active attacks and passive
attacks [8, 9].
2.3.1 Passive Attacks
A passive attack does not disrupt the normal operation of the network; the attacker
snoops the data exchanged in the network without altering it. Here the requirement
of confidentiality gets violated. Detection of passive attack is very difficult since
the operation of the network itself doesnt get affected. Details of different passive
attacks in MANET are given below [7].
• Eavesdropping: It aims to obtain some confidential information that should
be kept secret during the communication. The information may include the
location, public key, private key or even passwords of the nodes
• Traffic Analysis and Monitoring: Traffic analysis attack adversaries
monitor packet transmission to infer important information such as a source,
destination, and source-destination pair.
2.3.2 Active Attacks
An active attack attempts to alter or destroy the data being exchanged in the
network there by disrupting the normal functioning of the network. Active attacks
9
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can be internal or external. Details of different active attacks in MANET are given
below [7].
• Jamming attack: Jamming is the particular class of DoS attacks. The
objective of a jammer is to interfere with legitimate wireless communications.
A jammer can achieve this goal by either preventing a real traffic source from
sending out a packet, or by preventing the reception of legitimate packets.
• Wormhole attack: An attacker records packets at one location in the
network and tunnels them to another location. Routing can be disrupted when
routing control messages are tunneled. This tunnel between two colluding
attackers is referred as a wormhole.
• Wormhole attack: An attacker records packets at one location in the
network and tunnels them to another location. Routing can be disrupted when
routing control messages are tunnelled. This tunnel between two colluding
attackers is referred as a wormhole.
• Blackhole attack: The black hole attack has two properties. First, the node
exploits the mobile ad hoc routing protocol, such as AODV, to advertise itself
as having a valid route to a destination node, even though the route is spurious,
with the intention of intercepting packets. Second, the attacker consumes the
intercepted packets without any forwarding.
• Byzantine: A compromised intermediate node works alone, or a set of
compromised intermediate nodes works in collusion and carry out attacks such
as creating routing loops, forwarding packets through non-optimal paths, or
selectively dropping packets, which results in disruption or degradation of the
routing services.
• Sybil attack: If a malicious node impersonates some non-existent nodes, it
will appear as several malicious nodes conspiring together, which is called a
Sybil attack.
10
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• Fabrication: Instead of modifying or interrupting the existing routing packets
in the networks, malicious nodes also could fabricate their own packets to cause
chaos in the network operations.
• Modification: In a message modification attack, adversaries make some
changes to the routing messages, and thus endanger the integrity of the packets
in the networks.
• Repudiation: Repudiation refers to a denial of participation in all or part of
the communications.
• Denial of service (DoS) attack: Denial of service (DoS) is another type
of attack, where the attacker injects a large amount of junk packets into the
network. These packets overspend a significant portion of network resources,
and introduce wireless channel contention and network contention in the
MANET.
• Gray hole attack: The gray hole attack has two phases. In the first phase,
a malicious node exploits the AODV protocol to advertise itself as having a
valid route to a destination node, with the intention of intercepting packets,
even though the route is spurious. In the second phase, the node drops the
intercepted packets with a certain probability.
• Neighbor attack: Upon receiving a packet, an intermediate node records its
ID in the packet before forwarding the packet to the next node. However, if
an attacker simply forwards the packet without recording its ID in the packet,
it makes two nodes that are not within the communication range of each other
believe that they are neighbour (i. e. one-hop away from each other), resulting
in a disrupted route.
• Jellyfish attack: Similar to the black-hole attack, a jellyfish attacker first
needs to intrude into the forwarding group and then it delay data packets
unnecessarily for some amount of time before forwarding them.
11
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2.4 Different type of attacks on ad hoc network
routing protocols
Safe and secure communication is the great challenge in mobile ad hoc network.
For secure communication, securing data is not only the solution; securing route
discovery process is equally important. Because routing in MANET is not free from
the attackers. Different types of possible attacks in routing protocol in MANET are
as follows [8, 9].
• Flooding Attack:In flooding attack, malicious node continuously flood the
route request packet, which results in denial of service.
• Sleep Deprivation: In this type of attacks malicious node/nodes keeps
the other node/nodes busy by constantly engaging them in routing decision.
Attacker node constantly request for route discovery for existing or
non-existing destination nodes. As a result neighbouring nodes looses their
battery power and bandwidth resources.
• Black Hole Attack:The black-hole attack has two properties. First, the node
exploits the mobile ad hoc routing protocol, such as AODV, to advertise itself
as having a valid route to a destination node, even though the route is spurious,
with the intention of intercepting packets. Second, the attacker consumes the
intercepted packets without any forwarding.
• Routing Table flooding Attack:In this kind of attacks, malicious node
continuously flood the route request packet for different node as a result routing
table of the neighbour node becomes flooded
• Wormhole Attack:An attacker records packets at one location in the network
and tunnels them to another location. Routing can be disrupted when routing
control messages are tunnelled. This tunnel between two colluding attackers
is referred as a wormhole.
12
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• Fabrication: Instead of modifying or interrupting the existing routing packets
in the networks, malicious nodes also could fabricate their own packets to cause
chaos in the network operations.
• Modification: In a message modification attack, adversaries make some
changes to the routing messages, and thus endanger the integrity of the packets
in the networks.
2.5 Routing Protocol
Routing protocols in MANET specifies how nodes communicate with each other,
routing information that enables them to select routes between any two nodes
on a network. Routing algorithm determines the specific path of the route of
communication, so the communication in the network depends on the efficiency
and optimality of the routing algorithm. There are numerous routing available in
the literature, in accordance of its route finding types it is two types; Proactive and
Reactive [10].
Proactive Routing Protocol: All the routes to each destination are
maintained in an up-to-date table. if any Changes made in the network topology
are continually updated as they occur.
Reactive Routing Protocol: Route are only found when it is asked by the
source node and route is maintained unless it is asked to terminate by the source
node or after time exceed. In this section we will only discus AODV and DSR
routing protocol. AODV and DSR both are proactive routing protocol [11, 12].
2.5.1 Ad Hoc on Demand Distance Vector (AODV) Routing
Protocol
In AODV routing protocol, source node flood the route request (RREQ) to its
neighbour nodes to reach the destination. Intermediate nodes check its destination
13
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node if the node itself is not the destination then it rebroadcast the RREQ packet in
similar manner until it reaches the destination. On receiving the RREQ, destination
node generate the RREP packet and reply it through the reverse path in unicast
manner [11].
RREQ packet contains the following specifications; Source Address, Destination
Address, Source Sequence Number, Hop Count, Source Sequence Number,
Destination Sequence Number, Broadcast Id (Request Id) and time-to-live (TTL)
field.
Similarly RREP packet contains; Source Address, Destination Address, Sequence
Number, TTL.
2.5.2 Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) Protocol
DSR routing protocol is almost similar to the AODV routing protocol, except that
each intermediate node that broadcasts a route request(RREQ) packet adds its own
address identifier to a list carried in the packet.
In DSR, RREQ packet contains; Address Sequence, Destination Address, Hop
Count, Sequence Number and the RREP packet formate is similar to the RREQ
except its propagated in unicast direction [12].
2.6 Summary
Mobile ad hoc network has lot of limitations; design constrains, resource limitation
,etc but still application of MANET network is numerous. Since there is no
pre-existing infrastructure it suffers from many security threats. Now a days many
security protocol is available in the literature to overcome this security threats.
MANET network is vulnerable due to the lack of central authority or base station.
MANET is a unstable network with constantly changing topology makes it more
complex and challenging. But the use of mobile ad hoc network very vast, specially
in the disaster management system, military services, ect.
14
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Literature Survey
3.1 Introduction
Providing security at the time of finding the route for communication in MANET
is a challenging job. Many secure routing protocols are exist in the literature and
research in this area is gaining increasing attention. In this chapter we briefly discuss
the research conducted so far in secure routing protocol. There are number of secure
routing protocol exists, but they are mostly based on certification authority (CA)
or key distribution center (KDC) [14].
Chapter Organization: section 3.2 describes the literature survey of proposed
work, section 3.3 describes the summary of the chapter.
3.2 Literature Survey
Our routing protocol is based on Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) and Ad Hoc on
Demand Distance Vector Routing (AODV) [11, 12]. The route discovery process in
DSR is almost similar to the AODV protocol, except that each intermediate node
that broadcasts a route request (RREQ) packet adds its own address identifier to
a list carried in the packet. The destination node generates a route reply (RREP)
message that includes the list of addresses received in the route request and transmits
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it back along this reverse path to the source. The details of most related paper of
our research work are given bellow.
K.Sanzgiri and all; proposed secure routing protocol called ARAN, ARAN
is a on-demand secure routing protocol [15]. It detects and protects against
authentication, message integrity and non-repudiation. It uses asymmetric
key cryptography. ARAN requires trusted certification server, The certificate
accommodates the IP address of the node, its public key and a time-stamp of when
the certificate was created and a time at which the certificate expires along with the
signature by certification authority. But the disadvantages of ARAN is it uses the
central authority (Certification Authority) and it can’t protect against worm hole
attack.
Adrian Perrig and all ; proposed secure routing protocol called ARIADNE, A
secure on demand routing protocol for ad-hoc network (ARIADNE) is based on DSR
routing protocol, it uses highly efficient symmetric cryptography [16]. It provides
point-to-point authentication of a routing packets using a message authentication
code (MAC) and a shared key between the two parties. For broadcasting RREQ
packets it uses TESLA broadcast authentication protocol. TESLA keys are
distributed to the participating nodes via an online key distribution center.
Yih-Chun Hu and all; proposed secure routing protocol called SEAD, Secure
Efficient Ad-Hoc Distance Vector (SEAD) is based on destination-sequenced distance
vector routing (DSDV) protocol [17].It is a proactive routing protocol. SEAD deals
with attackers that modify routing information broadcast during the update phase
of the routing information. SEAD makes use of efficient one-way hash chains rather
than relying on expensive asymmetric cryptography operations. SEAD does not
cope with wormhole attacks.
K.Sanzgiri and all; proposed routing protocol called A Secure Routing Protocol
for Ad hoc Networks (SRP), relies on the availability of a security association (SA)
between the source node and the destination node [18]. The SA could be established
using a hybrid key distribution based on the public keys of the communicating
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parties. Source and destination can exchange secret key using each others public
key [19].
Manel Guerrero Zapata; proposed a routing protocol called Secure Ad Hoc
On-Demand Distance Vector (SAODV) Routing, it is a extension of AODV protocol
[20]. The Secure AODV scheme is based on the assumption that each node possesses
certified public keys of all network nodes. SAODV can be used to protect the
route discovery mechanism of the AODV by providing security features like integrity,
authentication and non repudiation. But in ad hoc network each node will know the
others public key its a challenge.
Seung Yi and all; proposed a secure routing protocol called Security-Aware
Ad-Hoc Routing (SAR) [21]. SAR is the generalized framework for any on demand
ad-hoc routing protocol. SAR uses Key distribution or secret sharing mechanism.
SAR may fail to find the route if the ad hoc network does not have a path on which
all nodes on the path satisfy the security requirements in spite of being connected.
Panagiotis Papadimitratos and all; proposed secure routing protocol called
Secure Link State Routing Protocol (SLSP) [22]. To function effectively without
central key management authority, SLSP enables each node to periodically broadcast
its public key to nodes within its zone. To achieve theses goals a Neighbor Lookup
Protocol (NLP) is made an integral part of SLSP.
Ranga Ramanujan and all; proposed a secure routing protocol called Techniques
for Intrusion-Resistant Ad Hoc Routing Algorithms (TIARA) [23]. TIARA
mechanisms protect ad hoc networks against denial-of-service (DoS) attacks
launched by malicious intruders. TIARA addresses two types of attacks on data
traffic which are flow disruption and resource depletion. It requires online public
key infrastructure.
Srdjan Capkun and all; proposed secure routing protocol called Building Secure
Routing out of an Incomplete Set of Security Associations (BISS) [24]. The sender
and The receiver can establish a secure route, even if, prior to the route discovery,
only the receiver has security associations established with all the nodes on the
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chosen route. It signs the request with its private key and includes its public key
PKI in the request along with a certificate signed by the central authority binding
its id with PKI.
Frank Kargl and all; proposed secure routing protocol called Secure Dynamic
Source Routing (SDSR) Protocol [25]. It is based on DSR routing protocol. It
checks the mutable and immutable field of the routing packets. and secure the
authenticity of all nodes participating in a route .
A Sivakumar Kulasekaran and all; proposed a secure routing protocol called An
efficient secure route discovery protocol for DSR [27]. It uses the peer review process
to make to secure routing protocol secure but it uses only DSR routing protocol,
packet size of the DSR routing protocol increase on passing by the intermediate
nodes.
Phung Huu Phu and all; proposed a secure routing protocol called securing
AODV routing protocol in MANET [28]. In this paper, each node tries to establish
key exchange in with its neighbour but if any node provides any wrong information
then it has to rely on it [29].
Calinescu Gruia; proposed a scheme to compute the two hop distance node in
“Computing 2-Hop Neighborhoods in Ad Hoc Wireless Networks”, it has been shown
that a node can find out its two hop neighbour safe and securely. Bathini Eswar
and all; uses two hop distance node to improve AODV Routing protocol [30].
3.3 Summary
Existing secure routing protocol are mostly based on some assumption but in all
cases those assumptions can’t be fulfilled. Many secure routing algorithms uses CA
and KDC through online or oﬄine. But if MANET network is established in such a
area where no internet is available than these kinds of assumption fails. So we need
to have a secure routing algorithm which can provide security in absence of internet
or any other infrastructure.
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Proposed Scheme 1
4.1 Introduction
Routing protocol is the backbone in any communication network. In this chapter
we have proposed a routing protocol called “Centralized Secure Routing Protocol
for Mobile Ad Hoc Network” [31]. CSRP algorithm is based on Master Node (MN),
which control the network, general node will be given a precomputed secret key,
when nodes tries to become part of the network master node verifies the secret key.
Based on the verification result if node passes the verification test it becomes the
part of the network and in subsequent steps route establishment and data delivery
is been done.
Chapter Organization: section 4.2 describes the details of CSRP algorithm,
subsection 4.2.1 describes the description of CSRP algorithm, subsection 4.2.2
describes the design of CSRP, section 4.3 describes the architecture of CSRP, section
4.4 describes the summary of the chapter.
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4.2 Proposed CSRP Algorithm
4.2.1 Description
In our proposed CSRP algorithm, the main idea is to create a safe and secure route
for data communication from source to destination. In CSRP architecture, we have
taken the concept of Master Node and the general nodes. The key idea of using
MN in MANET architecture is to provide a robust secure routing protocol. MN is
used as a trusted third party which is used for authenticating the nodes. If a node
wants to communicate with another node in MANET then the MN will generate
a session key between them. For generation of session key between two nodes N1
and N2, N1 has to send request to MN for establishing a session key KN1N2 with
N2 (neighbour). This process continues until we reach the destination. Then we
flood the RREQ requests to the trusted neighbouring nodes. Then we continue the
process until we reach the destination. We consider the RREQ which reach first
and then we send a RREP from destination to source through the route taken by
first RREQ. The data with the route as header is relayed by encrypting it with the
session key of the two nodes and it is decrypted with the same session key on other
end. This process continues till the destination is attained. This is how the data is
relayed securely from source to destination.
4.2.2 Design
Node Recognition
The first step of CSRP algorithm is to recognize a node. This means, the nodes in
an area set by the third party (organization) is to be recognized by MN to know
whether the nodes are genuine nodes or malicious nodes. For this, organization
places a pre-computed sign S and secret key SK in the general nodes before placing
the nodes in that area and it places a database of secret keys in MN. The public keys
e, n and hash function are also placed in MN. SK is common in MN and general
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nodes. For recognition of genuine nodes by MN it verifies the SK first and then
compute h1(SK) = S
e mod n. If the h(SK) matches with h1(SK) then it verifies it
as a genuine node and then MN changes the SK and places it again in the node. SK
changes with time interval. This modification helps in securing the key safe.
Algorithm 1 Node Recognition
1: Same SK is shared by MN and each node individually
2: MN knows the public key of signing algorithm
3: MN compute h(SK)
4: Sign S is pre-computed and placed in the general node along with SK
S = [h(SK)]
d mod n
h = hash function known by both MN and general node
5: General node send request (SK and S) to MN for verification
6: if SK (send by general node) = SK (stored in MN) then
7: h1(SK) = S
e mod n
8: if h(SK) = h1(SK) then
9: Node is genuine
10: else
Malicious Node
11: end if
12: else
Malicious Node
13: end if
14: SK changes with time interval
Connection Establishment and Secure Routing
The second step of our CSRP algorithm is to securely relay the data from source
to destination. After recognizing the nodes by MN, the nodes establish session keys
KN1N2 between themselves. If source want to send data to destination it establishes
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session keys between its neighbours and this process continues until we reach the
destination. Then we check the Battery Power Status (BPS) of the nodes except
source node and destination node. If BPS of a node is less than a threshold value (T)
then RREQ request is not send to that node. By doing this we reduce the flooding
of the packets, traffic in the network and power consumption. Then this process
continues until we reach the destination and we choose the route covered by the first
RREQ in the destination. Then a RREP is send from destination to sender and
data delivery starts from source. Data delivery is done by encrypting the data with
the session key and decrypting the data at other end. This encryption/decryption
process continues and finally the data reaches the destination. If in case at the time
of data delivery, an intermediate node fails then it searches for a new secure low cost
route.
Algorithm 2 Centralized Secure Routing
1: After recognizing the nodes they will be the part of the network
2: Communication starts between source and the destination by establishing KN1N2
between the nodes.
3: Check the BPS of the nodes
4: if BPS ≥ T then
Send RREQ requests to those nodes (flooding)
5: end if
6: RREQ flooding continues until the destination comes
7: Choose the first RREQ and send RREP through that route from destination to
source
8: Data is relayed by encrypting the data by KN1N2 and decryption is done by the
same KN1N2 at other end
9: Encryption/Decryption process continues until destination comes
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4.3 CSRP Architecture
CSRP gives a robust secure routing in the network. Here we have
presented the working of CSRP and its performance with the help of an architecture.
Figure 4.1 shows the CSRP architecture and the common secret keys which changes
with respect to time. Table 4.1 shows the table of secret keys. Figure 4.2 shows how
two nodes establish a session key. This process continues and every node establishes
a session key with its neighbouring nodes. Figure 4.3 presents that the key are
established. After session key establishment the source node broadcasts RREQ and
this process continues until RREQ reaches the destination. Then a RREP is send
from destination to source from that route in which RREQ comes first. Then the
data is delivered from the source in that route by encrypting it with the session key
of two neighbouring nodes in that route. Then this data is decrypted using the same
session key and this process continues until the data reaches destination. Figure 4.4
shows the flooding of RREQ and RREP from D to S. Figure 4.5 shows the data
delivery by encryption and decryption using session key. We know that MANET is
hugely affected by Spoofing attack, Black-hole attack, Wormhole attack, Byzantine
attack , [5] etc. which degrades the network performance. So, this architecture helps
in securing the data against these active and passive attacks and provides a secure
routing environment.
Figure 4.1: CSRP architecture
with secret keys
Figure 4.2: Session Key
establishment
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Figure 4.3: Session Key established
between the nodes
Figure 4.4: Flooding of RREQ to D
and RREP from D to S
Figure 4.5: Data delivery by encryption
and decryption using session key
4.4 Summary
CSRP algorithm is mainly for very secure communication like, military or any secure
services, where the nodes are given secret before deploying it to the remote places.
Any communication, where security needs is very high but infrastructure is present
or not enough there CSRP routing algorithm would be good option.
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Proposed Scheme 2
5.1 Introduction
Security in routing protocol in MANET is very essential. No existing secure routing
protocol is fully capable of preventing all security threats. In this chapter, we propose
secure routing algorithm called A Novel Approach of Secure Routing Protocol
(NASRP) to guarantee the integrity, non-repudiation and confidentiality of routing
packets without the presence of central authority. In our approach, it has three
steps; in the first step, each node perform a key exchange operation with its one and
two hop distance neighbours, in the second step, secure route establishment and in
the third step, secure data communication is performed. Key exchange operation is
done in two steps; in the first step, source node (S) exchanges public key (e) with
its one hop distance nodes and establish a secret key (SK), and in the second step,
source node exchanges public key with its two hop distance nodes and establish a
secret key. On establishing the key exchange process node can participate in routing
process. In route establishment process, secure route will be established between
the sender and receiver. In the third step, sender and receiver will exchange their
public key securely and establish a secret key for communication and then data
communication is performed.
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Chapter Organization: section 5.2 describes our proposed secure routing
protocol called “A Novel Approach of Secure Routing protocol”, subsection 5.2.2
describes details of NASRP, subsection 5.2.3 describes design of NASRP protocol,
subsection 5.2.4 describes the architecture of NASRP protocol, section 5.3 describes
summary of the chapter.
5.2 A Novel Approach of Secure Routing
Protocol
5.2.1 Preliminaries
In our proposed protocol, A Novel Approach of Secure Routing Protocol (NASRP),
primary idea is to create a safe and secure path (route) for data communication
between nodes. NASRP is a intermediate of AODV and SRP protocol. It follows
all the steps of AODV. Unlike DSR, NASRP contains only two address fields in the
routing packets where DSR accommodates all the intermediate nodes in the routing
packets. Figure 5.1 shows the format of the NASRP routing protocol where “DA”
represents Destination Address, “SA” represents Source Address, “HC” represents
Hop Count and “SN” represents Sequence Number. In NASRP, two address fields
is required, one is for accommodating super sender of packet with respect to the
present node and other is for sender of the packet. We have considered all nodes
follows RSA as public key crypto-system and every node has its own public key (e)
and private key (d), symmetric key algorithm and hash algorithm. NASRP provides
integrity, non-repudiation to the routing packets.
5.2.2 Description
In NASRP architecture, the key idea is to provide security to the routing protocol
without the presence of central authority (CA/KDC). Each node in the network
negotiates public key with its one hope distance neighbours and two hope distance
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Figure 5.1: RREQ Packet format of AODV, DSR and NASRP
neighbours [30] [32]. With the help of public key each node establish a secret key to
its one hope and two hopes distance neighbours by RSA public key crypto-system.
After completing the negotiation and key agreements nodes are eligible to participate
in communication. For data communication sender node initiates the route finding
process to reach the destination node by generating and broadcasting route request
(RREQ) packet. During the propagation of RREQ packet, each packet is verified
by its previous two hope distance sender node and if it is maintained the integrity
then the packet to be forwarded to next suitable node in the path.
Once RREQ packet reaches the destination and successfully verified, destination
node generates route reply packet (RREP) and propagate it in the same route by
following the similar verification process.
5.2.3 Design
The primary goal of NASRP scheme is to guarantee the integrity and
non-repudiation of routing messages so that the protocol can prevent many different
kinds of active and passive attacks. Our protocol has three different steps to provide
security, in the first stage key agreement process between one hop and two hope
distance neighbours, in the second stage route request and route reply, and in the
last stage public key exchange between the source and destination node and data
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communication. Details of the each steps are given bellow.
Key agreement between one hop distance neighbours
In the key agreement between one hop neighbours process, each node sends its
public key (es) and a sing of hash of public key (hash(es)
ds) to its one hop distance
neighbours. Neighbour node receive the request and verify it. After verifying the
packet, it generates a reply message which contains the public key (en) and a sing
MDC (Modification Detection Code) of public key (hash(en)
dn) of itself. After
completing the negotiation of public key, initiator node generates a secret key (SK)
and send it by encrypting the receiver’s public key (encrypten(SK)). The steps are
shown bellow, where S represents source node and N1 represents one hop distance
node and “→” represents direction of communication.
1. S → N1 : <Key Agreement Req,Request Id,Sender Addr,eS,hash(eS)dS>
2. N1 → S : <Key Agreement Rep,Request Id,Sender Addr,Neighbour Addr,
eN1, hash(eN1)
dN1>eS
3. Sender Node (S) generate a secret key (SK)
4. S → N1 : < Key Offer Req,Request Id, (SK), hash(SK) >eN1
5. N1 → S : < Key Offer Rep,Request Id, hashSK (Request Id) >es
Key agreement between two hop distance neighbours
In the key agreement process of two hop distance nodes, each node gather
information about the two hope neighbours and sends its public key (eS) and a
sing of MDC of public key (hash(eS)
dS) to its two hop distance neighbours. After
receiving the request neighbour node verify it and send acknowledgement, which
contains Request Id, Sender and Neighbour address, Public Key(eN2) of itself, a
sing of MDC of public key (hash(eN2)
dN2 ) of the neighbour and the sing of MDC
of public key (hash(eS)
dS) of the sender. The detail process are shown bellow,
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where S represents source node, N2 represents two hop distance neighbour and “→”
represents direction of communication.
1. S → N2 : <Key Agreement Req,Request Id,Sender Addr,(eS),hash(eS)dS>
2. N2 → S : <Key Agreement Rep,Request Id,Sender Addr,Neighbour Addr,
(eN2), hash(eN2)
dN2 , hash(eS)
dS>eS
3. Source Node (S) Generate a secret key SK
4. S → N2 : < Key Offer Req,Request Id, (SK), hash(SK) >eN2
5. N2 → S : < Key Offer Rep,Request Id, hashSK (Request Id) >eS
Route Request
For finding the route, source node, say S generate the route request(RREQ) packet
and broadcasts it. RREQ message is propagated by the intermediates nodes until
it reaches the destination node (D). After receiving RREQ message, intermediate
node (I) checks whether the message needs to be re-broadcast or not. If it is
needed to be re-broadcast it sends a message authentication request (unicast) to
the super sender of the RREQ message. On receiving the message authentication
request, super sender create a MAC (Message Authentication Code) of RREQ
message (hashSK (RREQ)) by using the secret key (SK) and encrypting it using the
intermediates public key (eI) and then send the entire message (hashSK (RREQ)
eI )
to the intermediate node. This process continues until the RREQ reaches the
destination node. Lets A, B and C are three consecutive nodes, where A is source and
B and C are the intermediate node through which packets are relaid. On receiving
the route request, B doesn’t check it’s integrity because its directly coming from the
source node but C will check it by doing following steps.
1. C → A : <RREQ Authen Req, Broadcast Id,Sequence Number,
Sender Addr>eA
29
Chapter 5 Proposed Scheme 2
2. A → C : <RREQ Authen Rep, Broadcast Id, Sender Addr,
Super Sender Addr, hashSK (RREQ)>
eC
Route Reply
On receiving the route request, destination node (D), generates route reply (RREP)
message and send it (unicast) through the reverse path of the arrival path. During
the propagation of the RREP packet, intermediate nodes check the authenticity and
integrity of the route reply message in the similar way of authentication of RREQ
message. Let X, Y and D are three nodes where D is destination node, which sending
route reply packet through Y and X path. X is te one hop distance node so the there
is no need of checking the integrity of the packet. Y is two hop distance node so it
will check the integrity of the message by sending the authentication request. steps
are shown bellow,
1. Y → D : <RREP Authen Req, Broadcast Id, Sequence Number,
Sender Addr>eD
2. D → Y : <RREP Authen Rep, broadcast Id, Sender Addr,
Super Sender Addr, hashSK (RREP )>
eY
Route Maintenance
In route maintenance process, during route finding if destination node is un reachable
then a error message (RERR) is generated and propagated to the source node.
During the RERR message propagation, it follows the message authentication
process. Authentication steps are shown bellow. Let P,Q and R three nodes and
R is the error message (RERR) generator, and it will propagate through p and Q
nodes, steps are as follows,
1. Q→ R : <RERR Authen Req, Host Unreachable Id, Sender Addr>eR
2. R → Q : <RERR Authen Rep, Host Unreachable Id, Sender Addr,
Super Sender Addr, hashSK (REER)>
eQ
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Data Communication Between Source and Destination
• Public Key Exchange: Before start data communication source (S) and
destination node (D) must know the public key of each other. To exchange
the public key we considered the similar to RREQ message authentication
process during the propagation of key exchange message
1. S → D : <Destin Addr,(eS), hash(eS)>
2. D → S : <Destin Addr,(eD), hash(eD)>eS
• Data Packet Exchange: On receiving the public key, source node (S)
generate a share key (shK) and encrypt ((shK)
ed) it by destinations public key
(ed) and sends it followed by the data packet. On receiving the key packet,
destination node decrypt it and get the shared key. Destination node decrypt
all rest of the packets by using the shared key. The detail steps are shown
bellow.
1. S → D :
– for secret key: < SK >
eD
– for data packet: < data >SK
5.2.4 Architecture
To describe the architecture of our proposed we have considered a MANET network,
shown in Figure 5.2, the network consist of {A, B, C, ..., K} nodes. We discuss the
details of each steps of our proposed routing protocol.
In the first step of key exachange operation: each node perform key
exchange operation with its one hop distance neighbour nodes; first each node
exchange public key and then a shared secret key. The key negotiation process
are shown in Figure 5.3
After negotiation and key exchange each node make a entry table, each node
maintain a table to keep record of the details of its one hop distance nodes. It keeps
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Figure 5.2: A MANET network
Figure 5.3: Key Exchange Process between one hop distance nodes
the record of Node Id, Public key and Secret key. From the above network (Figure
5.2), we took an example of node “B” and shown the table entry for all of its one
hop neighbours, Table 5.2 shows the entry for its one hop distance neighbours.
In the second step of key exchange operation: each node exchange their
public key and a share key with its two hope distance neighbours. The details of
negotiation and key exchange operation are shown in Figure 5.4, where N1 and N2
represents one and two hop distance neighbour respectively.
For each negotiation and key exchange, node will make a entry in the Table.
Each node maintain a table to keep record of the details of its two hop distance
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Table 5.1: Table entries for one-hop nodes
Node ID Public Key (e) Secret Key (SK)
A eA SK1
C eB SK2
G eC SK3
H eD SK4
Figure 5.4: Key Exchange Process between two hop distance nodes
neighbour nodes. From the above network (Figure 5.2), we took an example of node
“C” and makes the table entry for all of it’s two hop neighbours, Table 5.2 shows
the entry for it’s two hop distance neighbours.
RREQ and RREP packet forwarding: In the network (Figure 5.2), if node
A, wants to send the data to node F, then route request (RREQ) packet is to be
generated and broadcast to find the route to reach the destination. During the
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Table 5.2: Table entries for two-hop nodes
Node ID Intermediate Node Public Key (e) Secret Key (SK)
A B eA SK1
G B eG SK2
H B eH SK3
E D eE SK4
I D eI SK5
K D eK SK6
propagation of RREQ packet each time it will be reviewed by it two hop distance
away sender. If is satisfy the review process then only it will be propagated to the
farther nodes. The process are shown in Figure 5.5. Similarly, during route reply
and route maintenance each RREP and RERR packet will be verified by peer review
process by it two hop distance sender. Figure 5.6 shows the detail of route reply
process.
Figure 5.5: RREQ message verification Request and Reply
Figure 5.6: RREP message verification Request and Reply
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5.3 Summary
In this chapter each steps of design and architecture of our proposed NASRP protocol
are carefully shown. It preserves integrity, non-repudiation and confidentiality of
Routing packets as well as data packets. Our proposed algorithm follows a peer
review process and important point of our proposed algorithm is it doesn’t use any
central authority neither in online nor in oﬄine.
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Proposed Model Analysis
6.1 Introduction
NASRP scheme mainly guarantee integrity and non repudiation which leads to
prevention of many security threats of MANET routing protocol. In this section
we will analyse each steps of our proposed secure routing protocol (NASRP). First
we will discus the security measure of key exchange between one hop and two hop
distance nodes. In the second step we will discus the security measure of routing
information exchange and in the last step we will discus the security measure of data
packet transmission.
Chapter Organization: section 6.2 describes the analysis of NASRP protocol,
subsection 6.2.1 describes correctness key exchange between neighbours, subsection
6.2.2 describes the correctness of RREQ packets, subsection 6.2.3 describes the
correctness of RREP packets, subsection 6.2.4 describes correctness of data packet
transmission and section 6.3 describes summary of the chapters.
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6.2 Analysis
6.2.1 Key Exchange between Neighbours
Analysis of Public and Secret Key exchange between one hop neighbours
In the analysis of the key exchange process between one hop neighbours , we will
make a proof of key exchange operation. Figure 6.1 shows the proof of key exchange
operation between the one hop distance neighbours, where public key and secret key
are securely negotiated.
Figure 6.1: Analysis of key exchange between one hop neighbours
Analysis of Public and Secret Key exchange between two hop neighbours
The analysis of Key exchange between two hop neighbours shown in Figure 6.2,
where public key and secret keys are securely transferred. If intermediate node (N1)
node modifies the packet, then two situation can arise, first, if the node changes the
public key only and second, if it change the public key and sing of hash of public
key.
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Figure 6.2: Analysis of key exchange between two hop neighbours
1. Condition 1: if N1 node alters the public key only: If N1, alters the
public, say e1 is the modified public key, we can prove that it will not pass the
verification process in the destination node.
• S → D : < eS, hash(eS)dS >
• After modification public key becomes e1S
• h1 = hash(eS)dS∗e
1
S
• h = hash(e1S), hence, h1 6= h
2. Condition 2: if N1 node alters the public key and sing of hash of it:
If the node N1 alters public key and sign both, we can prove that it will not
pass the verification process in the destination node.
• S → D : < eS, hash(eS)dS >
• After modification public key becomes e1S and hash(e1S)d
1
S = h1
• since, it will be transmitted to the source node
• source node will compare, hash(e1S)d
1
S and eS, hash(eS)
dS
• hence, h1 6= h
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6.2.2 Analysis of RREQ packets
Figure 6.3: Peer Review process of RREQ packet
Lets A,B,C are three nodes, A send route request packet say RREQ to B. On
receiving RREQ packet, B send it to C, say now the packet is RREQ1. Now, node
C will verify the packet integrity by the following process.
1. A→ B : RREQ
2. B → C : RREQ1
3. C → A : < V erify RREQ, Sequence No >eA
4. A→ C : < RREQ, hashSK (RREQ) >eC
5. < RREQ, hashSK (RREQ) >
eC∗dC = < RREQ, hashSK (RREQ) >
6. h = hashSK (RREQ)
7. if(h == hashSK (RREQ)) then Accept
8. else Reject
9. end if
10. After verifying the MDC, Node C will do the following
11. if(RREQ1 → Destin addr = RREQ→ Destin addr)
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12. if ((RREQ1 → hop count−RREQ→ hop count) = +1)
13. if ((RREQ1 → Addr Seq − (RREQ1 → Addr Seq ∩ RREQ →
Addr Seq)) == RREQ→ Sender Addr)
14. Route Request is Genuine
6.2.3 Analysis of RREP packets
Figure 6.4: Peer Review process of RREP packet
On receiving the RREQ packet, destination node sends the route reply packet
(RREP) in similar fashion. Process are shown bellow.
1. D → C : RREP
2. C → B : RREP 1
3. B → D : < V erify RREP, Sequence No >eD
4. D → B : < RREP, hashSK (RREP ) >eB
5. < RREP, hashSK (RREP ) >
eB∗dB = < RREP, hashSK (RREP ) >
6. h = hashSK (RREP )
7. if(h == hashSK (RREP )) then Accept
8. else Reject
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9. end if
10. After verifying the MDC, Node B will do the following
11. if(RREP 1 → Destin addr = RREP → Destin addr)
12. if ((RREP 1 → hop count−RREP → hop count) == +1)
13. if ((RREP 1 → Addr Seq − (RREP 1 → Addr Seq ∩ RREP →
Addr Seq)) == RREP → Sender Addr)
14. Route Reply is Genuine
6.2.4 Analysis of Data packet Transmission
Figure 6.5: Peer Review process in public key exchange between S and D
Data packet transmission start in two steps; in the first steps source node and
destination node exchange the public key by using peer review process and in
the second step a secret key will be sent to the destination by encrypting it by
destination’s public key followed by data packet encrypted by secret key
• Public key exchange:
• A→ B : es, hash(es)
• B → C : es, hash(es)
• C → A : < V erify Packet >ea
• A→ C : < hash(es) >ec
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– < hashes >
ec∗dc = < hash(es) >= h′
– if(h == hash(es))
– Accept
– else
– Reject
– end if
• S → D : (SK)ed
– (SK)
ed∗dd = SK
• S → D : (data)SK
– (data)SK = data1
– (data1)SK=data
6.3 Summary
In this Chapter, we have mathematically proved the integrity, non-repudiation and
confidentiality is being maintained during the packet transmission. In each step of
analysis, correctness of the each step of NASRP protocol are carefully described.
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Comparison
7.1 Introduction
In this section, we have compared our proposed routing algorithm with the popular
existing routing algorithm. we have taken some security threats and analyse those
security threats in our proposed routing protocol with the existing secure routing
protocols.
Chapter Organization: section 6.2 describes the comparison of our routing
protocol with the existing routing protocols, section 7.3 describes the average
end-to-end delay comparison between AODV and NASRP, section 7.4 decries the
summary of the chapter.
7.2 Comparison with other secure routing
protocols
We have compared our proposed (NASRP) protocol with the existing popular
routing protocols. The comparison is based on security threats, encryption
algorithm, MANET Protocol are shown in Table 7.1. In comparison we have shown
our proposed protocol is providing integrity, non-repudiation and confidentiality but
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the central advantage of our protocol is it doesn’t need any central authority.
Table 7.1: Comparison between NASRP and other existing secure routing protocols
Protocol SAOVD ARAN ARIADNE SEAD NASRP
(Proposed)
Type Reactive Reactive Reactive Proactive Reactive
Encryption
Algorithm
Asymmetric Asymmetric Symmetric Symmetric Asymmetric
/Symmetric
MANET
Protocol
AODV AODV/DSR DSR DSDV DSR/AODV
(Modified)
Central Trust
Authority
Certificate
Authority
(CA)
Certificate
Authority
(CA)
Key
Distribution
Center
(KDC)
Certificate
Authority
(CA)
No Central
Authority
Authentication Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Confidentiality No Yes No No Yes
Integrity Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Non
Repudiation
Yes Yes No No Yes
Anti-Spoofing Yes Yes Yes No No
Dos Attacks No No Yes Yes No
Black-hole
Attacks
No No No No No
7.3 Average Transmission Delay Comparison
In this section we have compared our secure routing protocol with AODV routing
protocol with respect to the average end-to end transmission delay. We have
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considered 15 node in the area of 500m X 500m. We have considered the channel
bandwidth is 11 Mbps and packet size 512 KB. We have simulated the our algorithm
with 50, 100,150,200 and 250 number of packets and took average of it. Figure 7.1
shows the bar graph of average packet transmission delay vs number of packets.
Figure 7.1: Comparison of Average Packet Transmission Delay vs Number of Packets
7.4 Summary
Our proposed routing protocol, prevents many security threats like, Authentication,
Confidentiality, Integrity, Non Repudiation, etc. But there are some threats which
can not be prevented in NASRP secure routing protocol. But the central issue is it
does not use Certification Authority (CA) or Key-Distribution Center (KDC).
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Conclusion and Future Works
8.1 Conclusion
The lack of central authority and dynamic topology makes MANET network more
vulnerable. Our proposed secure routing protocol, CSRP provides security in closed
environment where high security is needed and all nodes deployed in the area are
from single authority and NASRP provides mainly integrity, non-repudiation and
confidentiality to the communication of the MANET networks. But NASRP, can’t
prevent back-hole , Byzantine like attacks which drops the packet with some certain
probability or entirely. Our protocol has a limitation, if there is two malicious node
in the routing path in the network, the secure protocol may violates. It mainly works
in a types of network where no two malicious node presents consecutively.
8.2 Future Work
Secure routing protocol with prevention of all attacks still a open challenge problem.
But in our proposed routing protocol we can add trust evaluation feature which
can prevent packet-dropping attacks like black-hole, Byzantine, etc. each node will
calculate the trust of its neighbour nodes and based on the trust value, it will be
decided that the node will be part of the network of not.
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